Mobile devices store confidential information. As a result, security vulnerabilities such as information disclosure in mobile apps can have serious consequences. To build secure apps, developers are expected to follow security policies that are described only informally. Some policies target architectural flaws, rather than coding defects, and are not easily checked or enforced with existing tools.
Introduction
We propose a semi-automatic approach, Scoria, to find architectural flaws such as information disclosure. One requirement of security analyses that find architectural flaws is to use a runtime architecture [2] . Previous work approximates a runtime architecture by a sound, hierarchical, Ownership Object Graph (OOG) that a static analysis extracts from code with annotations [3] . The OOG has nodes that represent abstract objects and groups of abstract objects, and edges that represent relations between objects. In an object hierarchy, an object does not have child objects directly. Instead, an object contains groups of objects (domains). A pointsto edge is a relation between two abstract objects due to a Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). SPLASH '13, October 26-31, 2013, Indianapolis, Indiana, USA. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). ACM 978-1-4503-1995-9/13/10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2508075.2514574 field reference. A dataflow communication between two abstract objects is due to a method invocation, field read or field write [3] . Similarly, a creation edge is due to an object allocation expression. Both a dataflow edge and a creation edge refer to an abstract object.
Scoria uses a security graph that is an OOG enriched with security properties and queries (SecGraph). Architects understand a runtime structure as needed and assign values for the security properties of abstract objects and edges using queries. A query returns a set of abstract objects or edges. A constraint is a predicate on the result of the query, such as the set is empty. The architects use Scoria to convert informally-specified security policies into machinecheckable constraints.
Description
The main contribution of Scoria is queries that capture the thought process of how an architect can reason about the communication of objects in a runtime architecture. For example, to find information disclosure, the architect assigns security properties to objects and finds a confidential object that flows into an untrusted destination. One consequence of representing dataflow as an object is that an architect can use object identity to reason about the information content available from an object. The dataflow object may not be confidential, but a confidential object could be reachable from it or be contained within its substructure.
Scoria automatically considers object ancestors and descendants, transitive communication, and reachability. Such information allows the architect to reason about the object provenance. That is, an architect can reason about "what" object a dataflow communication refers to, and "how" other objects are using the same dataflow object. Scoria also enables architects to query indirect communication through object hierarchy and reachability. Architects may miss such communication if they were to reason based on a diagram alone, because it requires computing transitive information.
The demonstration starts with examples of queries that architects can use to assign values to properties of objects in the SecGraph. Next, architects use constraints based on object provenance and indirect communication queries to find architectural flaws as suspicious dataflow communication edges. A SecGraph also provides traceability information Figure 1 . A constraint implemented as a JUnit test to find information disclosure in objects of type Intent such that architects can trace from a suspicious edge directly to the code and investigate the vulnerability. Scoria works as follows: architects add annotations to code; the static analysis extracts SecGraph; architects assign security properties to abstract objects and edges using SecGraph queries; architects write and execute constraints and finds suspicious edges; architects trace to code from suspicious edges and inspect potential vulnerabilities. Example of a found architectural flaw. We illustrate using Scoria to find information disclosure in UPMA, an opensource Android application for managing passwords. During the demonstration, we will assume that the OOG has been already extracted and focus on the process of assigning security properties and writing constraints.
Android security policy dictates that confidential information should not be disclosed to objects of type Intent, since other applications can access it. We implement this policy as the insecureIntents constraint (Fig. 1 ) that is then executed against the UPMA SecGraph. First, the constraint assigns the Untrusted property to all objects of type Intent. Objects of the same type can have different property values. Scoria allows the architect to assign the IsConfidential property to those objects of type String that have a parent of type AccountInformation. Next, the constraint finds an information disclosure in the ViewAccountDetails class through a creation edge (Fig. 3) . The password is exposed indirectly being a child of the AccountInformation object that is referred by the ViewAccountDetails object. In addition, Scoria finds a second vulnerability in the AccountsList class where the unencrypted password is disclosed to the Android clipboard through a dataflow edge. Since the clipboard is accessible to any other app, passwords stored by UPMA are vulnerable to eavesdropping. Implementation. Scoria is based on a typechecker, an extraction analysis, and a constraint checker. The typechecker and the extraction of OOG with points-to edges were previously demonstrated [1] . In this demonstration, we focus on extracting dataflow edges [3] and on implementing security policies as constraints. Although the demonstration will focus on Android apps, tools are suitable for any Java system.
The extraction analysis is implemented using the Crystal framework as an Eclipse plugin. Constraints are implemented as SecGraph queries, such that architects can write Figure 3 . UPMA code that introduce vulnerabilities and execute constraints as JUnit tests. From the query results, Scoria can trace to AST nodes, such that the architect locates the vulnerability in the code. To debug queries, Scoria also includes a visualization of the SecGraph (Fig. 2) .
